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Introduction
For nearly two decades, the Supreme Court has tinkered with the
analysis used for measuring the constitutionality of official restrictions
on commercial speech as first set out in Central Hudson Gas and
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission in 1980.' Since deciding
that case, the Court has ruled in five "vice" advertising cases: Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico in
1986,2 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. in 1993,' Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co. in 1995, 4 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island in 1996,'
and most recently, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v.
United States in 1999.6
The extent to which government ought to regulate the promotion
of so-called "vice" products like tobacco and alcohol, and activities
such as gambling, is one of the most controversial contemporary
advertising issues Advertisers spend massive amounts of money each
year seeking customers for legal products such as cigarettes,
smokeless tobacco, beer, wine, and distilled spirits; and lawful
gambling facilities such as state lotteries, private and public casinos,
and horse and dog racing tracks, among others.
Often, when federal or state governments seek to curtail the
potentially harmful effects of these products and activities,
restrictions on advertising are politically attractive. The legislative
rationale often assumes that curtailing advertising for a product like
alcohol, for instance, will dampen consumer demand and thus
alleviate social costs related to harmful secondary effects, like
alcoholism.
1. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
2. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
3. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
4. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
5. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
6. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
7. This article focuses on legal questions, particularly constitutional ones,
surrounding this issue. The authors acknowledge that the advertising of potentially
harmful "vice" products raises serious ethical issues in addition to legal ones. This paper
does not address the ethical side of this realm, leaving that to other commentators. See
generally, e.g., A. DAVID KITrROSS AND JOHN MICHAEL GORDON, CONTROVERSIES IN
MEDIA ETHICS 239-55 (2d ed. 1999) (overview of ethical issues in advertising including
advertising potentially harmful products). For an interesting ethical framework for
application in the context of persuasive communications, such as advertising and public
relations messages, see generally Sherry Baker, Five Baselines for Justification in
Persuasion, 14 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 69 (1999).
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Even with laudable regulatory goals, government does not have
free reign to restrict commercial messages. Truthful, non-deceptive
advertising has been explicitly protected as "commercial" speech
under the free speech clause of the First Amendment since 1976.8
However, the Supreme Court has held that "pure" commercial
speech - speech that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction - does not merit the full First Amendment protection
afforded to other forms of expression, such as political and social
speech.9 The extent to which government may regulate protected
commercial speech in general, and "vice" advertising in particular, is
an issue that continues to test First Amendment free speech
principles and jurisprudence. This article attempts to examine how
the Supreme Court has dealt with "vice" advertising within the
constitutional framework of commercial speech protection. For
purposes of this article, "vice" advertising is defined as the advertising
or promotion of products or activities that, while legal for adults, can
ha', .!,rmful consequences for consumers and society.1"
The article first examines the commercial speech doctrine and
the Central Hudson analysis. In subsequent sections, the article
examines the progression of "vice" advertising cases from 1986
through 1999 in the overall context of the Supreme Court's
commercial speech doctrine." The article focuses on the language and
rationale employed by various justices in relevant commercial speech
8. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 760-770 (1976). It should be noted that the Supreme Court has said that false or
deceptive advertising, or that which involves an illegal activity, falls outside the First
Amendment protection otherwise available to truthful, non-deceptive advertising about a
lawful product or activity. See id. at 771 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
340 (1974); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)).
For a discussion of theoretical and ideological perspectives on extending First
Amendment coverage to commercial speech, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits,
Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123,
130-38 (1999) (looking at First Amendment theories including those involving self-
government, truth, and self-determination or autonomy).
9. See Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 760. It should be noted here that a communication
message can contain both commercial and-non-commercial speech, but the point is that
the Court has, in its jurisprudence, distinguished between messages that are commercial in
nature and those that are not for purposes of First Amendment treatment of those
messages. See id. at 761-62. This article will not cover the commercial/non-commercial
dichotomy, as other commentators have explored that topic. See, e.g., Daniel E. Troy,
Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 121-22 (1999).
10. See Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. at 426; Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340-41.
11. This paper focuses primarily on the commercial speech doctrine as articulated by
the Supreme Court in its commercial speech opinions. The paper does not deal with lower
court opinions except for those lower court opinions directly relevant to the Supreme
Court opinions discussed and analyzed in this paper.
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and "vice" advertising cases. Consequently, this article appears to be
unique in tracing the progression of "vice" advertising cases in detail
through the 1999 holding in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
Association.12
What is remarkable about this line of cases is that the Court has
completely reversed its position on "vice" advertising. Originally,
"vice" advertising was effectively excluded from First Amendment
commercial speech protection. The article argues that after 1999, the
Supreme Court has virtually eliminated the "vice" advertising
distinction and now requires equal treatment under the First
Amendment of all truthful, non-deceptive advertising for lawful
products and services. In doing so, the Court appears to be retreating
from a longstanding practice of assuming as axiomatic a positive
correlation between advertising and consumer demand and
consumption. More broadly, the article argues that the decisions in
Rubin, 44 Liquormart, and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
elevated First Amendment protection for commercial speech to its
highest level, approaching that of fully protected political and social
speech. The article concludes with a summary of established
principles and implications derived from the cases analyzed.
12. See generally, e.g., Sean P. Costello, Comment, Strange Brew: The State of
Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Before and After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681 (1997); William O'Neill, Governmental Restrictions on
Beverage Alcohol Advertising After 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J.
267 (1998); Jef I. Richards, Is 44 Liquormart a Turning Point?, 16 J. PUB. POL'Y &
MARKETING 156 (1997); Sullivan, supra note 8; Marrie K. Stone, Note, The Price Isn't
Right: 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island Promotes Free Speech in Commercial




Commercial Speech and the First Amendment
Until the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court characterized selling
messages in advertising as "commercial activity" and not as protected
speech under the First Amendment. 3 In a landmark 1976 ruling, the
Court assimilated commercial speech into the protection of the First
Amendment free speech clause.1 4 Subsequently, in 1980, the Court set
out a four-factor, constitutional test of intermediate scrutiny for
governmental regulations of protected commercial speech.15
A. The Virginia Board Case (1976)
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., the Court stated explicitly for the first time
that pure commercial speech - speech intended solely to "propose a
commercial transaction" - is protected under the First Amendment.
1 6
In Virginia Board, the Court struck down a state regulation that
banned licensed pharmacists from advertising prescription drug
prices. In so holding, the Court said the First Amendment protects
not only commercial speakers and their messages, but also the
public's right to receive these messages. 7
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun said that consumers
have an interest in commercial information that "may be as keen, if
not keener by far, than [their] interest in the day's most urgent
political debate."'" For instance, he pointed out, individuals -
especially the poor, sick, and aged - need prescription drug price
information to determine where their limited medical dollars might
be best spent. 9 Blackmun stated:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem, nonetheless is dissemination of information as to who is
13. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 920, 921 (1942). See also Breard v. Alexander,
341 U.S. 622 (1951).
14. See Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. 748.
15. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557.
16. See Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 762. In 1975, the year prior to deciding the Virginia
Bd. case, the Court decided Bigelow v. Virginia, 412 U.S. 809, 825 (1975), and began to
recede from the notion that commercial speech was wholly unprotected under the First
Amendment, but it did not squarely address the issue. See Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 760-61.
17. See id. at 756 (stating that "[f]reedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker"
and "the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source, and to its recipients").
18. Id. at 763.
19. See id.
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producing and selling what product and for what reason. So long as
we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation
of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this
end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
20
In addition, Blackmun said, some commercial advertisements
provide information on significant public issues.2' For instance, an
advertisement for American-made products might inform the public
about alternatives to imported products that could be harmful to the
domestic job market.22 However, Blackmun was careful to point out
that advertising need not contain such an "important" message in
order to merit constitutional protection.23
B. The Central Hudson Case (1980) and Four-Factor Analysis
The Virginia Board Court said government can regulate
commercial speech but left undecided how much regulation the First
Amendment would tolerate. In 1980, in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the Court
set out a variation of intermediate scrutiny to test the constitutionality
of government regulations on commercial speech.2 ' That four-factor
analysis was first articulated as follows:
[First], we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern a lawful activity and not be
misleading. [Second], we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must [third] determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and [fourth] whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Most of the Supreme Court's commercial speech decisions since
Central Hudson have turned on the application of the third and
fourth factors. The Court has since described the third factor as the
"direct-advancement inquiry" because the regulation must advance
the asserted interest in a direct and material way.26 Under the fourth
factor, the regulation must be narrowly tailored. This means the
20. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
21. See id. at 764.
22. See id. (citing Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971)).
23. See id. at 765 (suggesting that there is no constitutional need to draw a line
between "important" and merely "interesting" commercial messages).
24. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
25. Id.
26. See Greater New Orleans, 527 U. S. at 183.
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regulation may not be more restrictive of speech than needed to
accomplish the asserted regulatory goal, although the least restrictive
means is not required.27
The assumption that advertising fuels consumer demand and
consumption was the foundation of the Central Hudson opinion. In
the case, the Supreme Court struck down a New York ban on
promotional advertising by electrical utilities because the ban was too
broadly worded.28 However, the Court agreed with New York that the
state had a sufficiently substantial regulatory interest in energy
conservation.29 The Court said there was a "direct link" between the
advertising regulation and the regulatory goal of energy conservation
because of the "immediate connection between advertising and the
demand for electricity."3 There was no empirical evidence in the
record on this point, but the Court presumed that the utility company
"would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that
promotion would increase sales."'"
II
Early Gambling Advertising Cases
After the Central Hudson case, the first two Supreme Court
cases addressing the constitutionality of government restrictions on
"vice" advertising were Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico,32 decided in 1986, and United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Company,33 decided in 1993."4 In both cases the Court
27. See Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). The
Court said in Fox:
[W]e have not gone so far as to impose ... the burden of demonstrating ... that
the manner of restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve the
desired end. What our decision requires is a "'fit' between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends ....," a fit that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition
but one whose scope is "in proportion to the interest served."
Id. (internal citations omitted). One commentator has called this point from Fox a "blow"
to commercial speech protection that provides "legislative bodies more discretion in
fashioning limits on commercial speech." Richards, supra note 12, at 157.
28. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557.
29. See id. at 568.
30. See id. at 568-569.
31. Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the Court had
cited no empirical support for this assertion. Id. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
32. 478 U.S. 328 (Brennan, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting). The appellee, Tourism
Company of Puerto Rico, was a governmental agency charged with regulating the casino
industry in Puerto Rico.
33. 509 U.S. 418.
34. In 1971, the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, upheld provisions in the
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used the Central Hudson analysis and upheld government restrictions
of advertising for legalized gambling. Also, in both cases, the Court
deferred to governmental regulatory interests over the First
Amendment rights of commercial speakers and those of the public to
receive truthful, non-deceptive commercial messages. In addition, the
Court continued to rely upon the assumed causal connection between
advertising and demand and consumption.
A. The Posadas Case (1986)
In Posadas, a narrow 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court upheld
Puerto Rican restrictions on casino gambling advertisements.35 The
Puerto Rican legislature had legalized casino gambling in the 1948
Games of Chance Act ("1948 Act") to encourage tourism.36 However,
the 1948 Act, including subsequent enabling regulations, banned
casinos from targeting gambling ads to the "public of Puerto Rico."37
The 1948 Act only allowed casinos to advertise in "publicity media
Federal Communications Act that prohibited cigarette advertising on electronic media
subject to regulation by the Federal Communications Commission. See Capital Broad. Co.
v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd sub nor Capital Broad. Co. v.
Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). The Supreme Court affirmed in 1972 without opinion.
This case was decided before the Supreme Court assimilated commercial speech into the
First Amendment in 1976, and the district court said that "Congress has the power to
prohibit the advertising of cigarettes in any media." See Capital Broad., 333 F. Supp. at
584. The district court also relied on Supreme Court precedent allowing regulation of
broadcast media as a public resource that must be operated in the interest of the public.
See id. at 586 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Federal Comm. Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367
(1969)).
35. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion and
was joined by Justices Burger, White, Powell, and O'Connor. Justice Brennan wrote a
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. See id. at 348-59 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Marshall
and Blackmun. See id. at 359-363 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For law review treatment of the
Posadas case, see generally Phillip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism
Company: "'Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange, 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful,"
1986 SuP. Cr. REV. 1 (1986).
36. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 332 (citing Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 of
May 15, 1948, § 2, codified, as amended, at P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 15, § 71 (1972)). The
Games of Chance Act of 1948 included roulette, dice and card games in licensed
"gambling rooms." See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 332. Subsequent amendments to the Games of
Chance Act of 1948 added bingo and slot machines. See id. (citations omitted).
37. See id. at 332-33 (citations omitted). The Games of Chance Act of 1948 provided
that "[n]o gambling room shall be permitted to advertise or otherwise offer their facilities
to the public of Puerto Rico." Id. (citing Games of Chance Act of 1948, Act No. 221 of
May 15 1948, § 8, codified, as amended, at P.R. Laws Ann., Tit. 15, § 77 (1972)). Enabling
regulations enacted by the Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, a public company with
official regulatory authority, also provided that "[n]o concessionaire, nor his agent or
employee is authorized to advertise the gambling parlors to the public in Puerto Rico."
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 332 (citing 15 R. & R.P.R. § 76a-1(7) (1972)).
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outside Puerto Rico."38 Despite this restriction, Puerto Rican
residents were not prohibited from gambling in the casinos.
A Texas company operating a casino in Puerto Rico was fined
for violating the advertising restrictions. The company challenged the
regulations on First Amendment grounds in the Superior Court of
Puerto Rico.39 The court found the restrictions constitutional, but
limited their scope with "narrowing constructions., 41 In sum, the court
limited the ban to "advertisement[s] ... contracted with an
advertising agency, for consideration, to attract the [Puerto Rican]
resident to bet at the dice, card, roulette and bingo tables.",4' But, the
court said, the restrictions did not prohibit casino advertising that
only incidentally reached the Puerto Rican public. For instance, the
narrowing constructions allowed advertisements placed in U.S. media
like the New York Times newspaper and the CBS television network,
which also reached Puerto Ricans.42 On appeal, the Puerto Rican
Supreme Court concluded the advertising restrictions, as modified by
the narrowing constructions, did not raise a significant constitutional
issue.
43
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the advertising
restrictions as modified by the narrowing constructions.44 The Court
said the restricted advertising was "pure commercial speech, 45 and
thus subject to scrutiny under the four-factor Central Hudson
38. See Posadas at 332-33. Official regulations stated:
The advertising of our games of chance is hereby authorized through
newspapers, magazines, radio, television and other publicity media outside
Puerto Rico subject to the prior editing and approval by [the regulatory agency]
of the advertisement to be submitted to the Tourism Development Company of
the advertisement to be submitted in draft to the Company.
Id. (citations omitted). In addition, in 1979, the Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, a public
company with official regulatory authority over licensed casinos, had sent an official
memo to casinos franchise holders advising that use of the word "casino" was prohibited
on items such as matchbooks, napkins, menus, glasses, flyers, and directories, and "any
object that might have been accessible to the public in Puerto Rico." Id. at 333 (citation to
memo omitted).
39. See id. at 334.
40. See id. at 335-37.
41. Id. at 335 (citation to Superior Court order omitted).
42. See id. The narrowing constructions also would allow advertising in Puerto Rico's
international air and seaports serving tourists and Puerto Ricans alike.
43. See id. at 337 (quoting the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico) (citation omitted).
Actually, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico dismissed the appeal. See id.
44. See id. (stating "in reviewing the facial constitutionality of the challenged statute
and regulations, we must abide by the narrowing constructions announced by the Superior
Court and approved sub silento by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico").
45. Id. at 340 (quoting Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 762).
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analysis.46 Under the first factor, the Court said casino ads aimed at
Puerto Ricans are protected commercial speech because they involve
a legal activity and are not inherently misleading."
Puerto Rico asserted a governmental interest in protecting the
"health, safety, and welfare" of its citizens by reducing the "demand
for casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico."48 Puerto Rico
claimed that increased casino gambling by Puerto Ricans would lead
to "the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local
crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption,
and the infiltration of organized crime."4 9 Under the second Central
Hudson factor, the Posadas Court agreed that this regulatory interest
was sufficiently substantial.0
The Posadas Court said the third and fourth factors "involve a
consideration of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends."5' Under the third step, the Posadas
majority simply agreed with Puerto Rico that the advertising ban
"directly advance[d]" the asserted regulatory goal. 2 Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist relied on Central Hudson and the
assumed causal link between advertising and consumer demand and
consumption, stating:
The Puerto Rican Legislature obviously believed, when it enacted
the advertising restrictions at issue here, that advertising of casino
gambling aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico would serve to
increase the demand for the product advertised. We think the
legislature's belief is a reasonable one, and the fact that [Puerto
Rico] has chosen to litigate this case all the way to this Court
indicates that [Puerto Rico] shares the legislature's view.
53
46. See id. (citing generally Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557-606).
47. See id. at 340-41.
48. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. See id. (comparing Renton v. Playtime Theatres Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)). In
his dissenting opinion, Brennan, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, suggested wryly it was
"not farfetched to suppose that the [Puerto Rican] legislature chose to restrict casino
advertising not because of the 'evils' of casino gambling, but because it preferred that
Puerto Ricans spend their gambling dollars on the Puerto Rico lottery." Id. at 353-54
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 341.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 342 (emphasis added) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569) (stating,
"There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity")
(other citation omitted). The majority found the ban also was "no more extensive than
necessary," satisfying the fourth part of the Central Hudson analysis, since the ban applied
only to "advertising when aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico." Id. at 343.
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Under the fourth Central Hudson factor, the Court concluded
the modified restrictions were sufficiently narrow because they
allowed advertisements targeted to tourists instead of banning all
casino gambling ads. 4 Rehnquist said it did not matter that Puerto
Rico regulated casino gambling advertising while allowing advertising
for other forms of more "traditional" and less-sophisticated forms of
gambling, such as horse racing, cock fighting, and lotteries.5 Clearly
endorsing the paternalistic approach taken by Puerto Rico, Rehnquist
wrote: "[T]he [Puerto Rican] legislature felt that for Puerto Ricans
the risks associated with casino gambling were significantly greater
than those associated with the more traditional kinds of gambling in
Puerto Rico.
56
Rehnquist also said Puerto Rico had the power to ban casino
gambling altogether, so it was constitutionally permissible to "take
the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the
demand through restrictions on advertising."57 The majority found
this rationale particularly persuasive in the context of "harmful"
products like cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. 8 Rehnquist wrote:
It would be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede
to the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity,
but deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of
demand for the product or activity through advertising on behalf of
those who would profit from such increased demand.
As mentioned, the Posadas majority was narrow, with four of the
nine justices casting dissenting votes.6° Justice Stevens, representing
the acerbic tone of the dissenters, said the restrictions were
"blatantly" discriminatory and established both a "regime of prior
restraint" and a "hopelessly vague and unpredictable" standard.61 He
54. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 343-44.
55. See id.. The Posadas majority concluded the casino gambling advertising
restrictions were not unconstitutionally underinclusive. See id. at 342-43.
56. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 346 (stating "[i]t would surely be a Pyrrhic victory for casino owners... to
gain recognition of a First Amendment right to advertise their casinos to the residents of




60. Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Marshall and Blackmun joined. See
id. at 348-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Marshall and Blackmun again joined. See id. at 360-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 359 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Marshall and Blackmun joined in the
dissenting opinion of Stevens. See id. The Posadas majority had concluded in the principal
opinion that the advertising restrictions as modified by the narrowing constructions of the
lower court were not unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 347-48.
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stated: "The First Amendment surely does not permit Puerto Rico's
frank discrimination among publications, audiences, and words. Nor
should sanctions for speech be as unpredictable and haphazard as the
roll of dice in a casino."62
B. The Edge Broadcasting Case (1993)
In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Company, decided in 1993,
the Court upheld part of a longstanding federal broadcast ban on
gambling advertising.63 The specific provisions at issue were 18 U.S.C.
§ 1304 (hereinafter "section 1304"), which bans gambling ads on
licensed broadcast media; and 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (hereinafter "section
1307"), which, in relevant part, exempts ads for state-sponsored
lotteries aired by broadcasters licensed in lottery states.' The case
arose when WMYK-FM, a North Carolina radio station owned by
Edge Broadcasting, wanted to broadcast paid advertising for the
state-sponsored lottery in bordering Virginia. Most of the station's
listeners were located in Virginia,65 but the federal ban still applied
62. Id. at 363 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 425, 436. For law review case comment treatment,
see generally Laura J. Schiller, Case Note, The Lottery in United States v. Edge
Broadcasting Co.: Vice or Victim of the Commercial Speech Doctrine?, 2 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 127 (1995).
64. A longstanding federal law banned the broadcast of "any advertisement of or
information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme." 18 U.S.C. § 1304
(1988 ed., Supp. III). The ban did not apply to "an advertisement, list of prizes, or other
information concerning a lottery conducted by a State acting under the authority of State
law which is... broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in that
State or a State which conducts such a lottery." 18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(1)(B) (1988 ed., Supp.
III). Congress enacted the exemption for state-sponsored lotteries in 1975 to
accommodate the 13 states with state-sponsored lotteries (Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island) and the 25 states that allowed lotteries sponsored
by an entity other than the state government (Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin). See generally H.R. REP. No.
93-1517 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7007.
Enabling regulations enacted by the Federal Communications Commission contain
substantially the same language. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1990) (first enacted at 40 FED.
REG. 6,210 (1975), as amended at 45 FED. REG. 6,401 (1980); 54 FED. REG. 20,856 (1989);
55 FED. REG. 18,888 (1990)). The FCC regulations define "lottery" as "the pooling of
proceeds derived from the sale of tickets or chances and allotting those proceeds or parts
thereof by chance to one or more chance takers or ticket purchasers." 47 C.F.R. §
73.1211(d)(1) (1990).
65. See Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 423-24.
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because WMYK-FM was licensed in North Carolina, a non-lottery
state.66
Edge Broadcasting challenged the ban on First Amendment
grounds in federal district court in Virginia.67 The district court used
the Central Hudson analysis to find the ban unconstitutional as
applied to WMYK-FM. The district court suggested that the
regulatory goal of discouraging citizens in non-lottery states from
participating in lotteries was not served by applying the ban to a
station whose listeners were mostly located in a neighboring lottery
state. Thus, the district court said, the ban failed the third part of the
Central Hudson analysis under the facts of the case.68 The federal
court of appeals affirmed the district court.6 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed 7-2 and upheld the ban
under the Central Hudson analysis. Under the first Central Hudson
factor, the Edge Broadcasting Court said the federal regulations
effectively banned protected commercial speech, meaning non-
misleading advertising about a legal state lottery.7" Under the second
factor, the Court summarily concluded that Congress had substantial
regulatory interests at stake: "[S]upporting the policy of nonlottery
States, as well as not interfering with the policy of States that permit
lotteries.,71 Invoking language from Posadas, the Court reiterated
that gambling is not a constitutionally protected activity, but is
instead appropriately characterized as a "'vice' activity" that states
may lawfully ban.72
66. See id. at 422-23. As of January 2000, North Carolina still did not have a state-run
lottery.
67. See id. at 424.
68. See id. at 424-25.
69. See id. at 425. The Supreme Court noted that the appeals court had issued an
unpublished per curium opinion, which the Court deemed "remarkable and unusual"
given the constitutional gravity of the case. See id. at 425 n.3.
70. See id. at 426.
71. Id. Earlier in the opinion the Court noted relevant legislative history, stating that
the exemption allowing broadcast licensees in lottery states to air advertisements for state-
run lotteries was passed "'to accommodate the operation of legally authorized State-run
lotteries consistent with continued Federal protection to the policies of non-lottery
States."' Id. at 422 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1404, at 2 (1974), and citing also H.R. REP.
No. 93-1517 (1974), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 7007 (1974)).
The dissenters said the Court's conclusion on this part of the Central Hudson was made
"[w]ith barely a whisper of analysis." Id. at 440 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Blackmun, J.).
72. See id. at 426 (citing generally Posadas, 478 U.S. 328). The United States tried to
avoid the constitutional issue altogether. Relying on the Posadas rationale, the
government argued that the power to ban an activity like gambling necessarily includes
the "lesser" power to constitutionally ban advertisements for that activity. See id.
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Under the third Central Hudson factor, the Court concluded that
the federal broadcast ban "directly served" to protect the lottery
policies of individual states. 3 Writing for the majority, Justice White
stated: "[The] congressional policy of balancing the interests of
lottery and nonlottery States is... substantial [and] satisfies Central
Hudson."74 The majority looked at the general application of the ban
and refused to consider the individual impact on stations like
WMYK-FM that are licensed in non-lottery states but border on
lottery states and have most of their listeners there. 5 As to the final
Central Hudson factor, the Edge Broadcasting Court concluded the
ban was sufficiently narrow. 6 Suggesting that Congress could have
banned all broadcast lottery advertising,77 the Court characterized the
ban and exemption scheme as "reasonable.""
However, the Edge Broadcasting Court specifically declined to rule on this issue, stating
that the ban otherwise passed constitutional muster under the Central Hudson analysis.
See id. at 425. It should be noted here that the 5-4 majority in Posadas, discussed earlier in
the text of this article, had strongly suggested that the governmental power to ban an
activity like gambling included the power to regulate advertising about that activity. See
supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
73. See id. at 428.
74. Id. at 428-29.
75. See id. White seemed to admit that application of the ban in such border
situations only marginally advanced the asserted regulatory interest, but he found this
insufficient to strike down the ban under the third Central Hudson factor. See id. He said
that the "courts below were wrong in holding that as applied to Edge itself, the restriction
at issue was ineffective and gave only remote support to the Government's interest." Id. at
431. Later in the opinion, White said "we judge the validity of the restriction in this case
by the relation it bears to the general problem of accommodating the policies of both
lottery and nonlottery States, not by the extent to which it furthers the Government's
interest in an individual case." Id. at 430-31. Only four justices joined with White in these
parts of the opinion (III-A, B, and C). In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter, joined by
Justice Kennedy, said that he found the ban constitutional under the Central Hudson
analysis, even as applied individually to WMYK-FM, the North Carolina station in
question. See id. at 436 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.). Souter thus found it
"unnecessary to decide whether the restriction might appropriately be reviewed at a more
lenient level of generality." Id. at 436 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.).
76. See id. at 429-30.
77. See id. at 428.
78. See id. at 429. In this part of the Court opinion (III-B), White said the
constitutional analysis must be guided by general application of the ban and exemption
scheme, without consideration of how it might apply to individual stations like WMYK-
FM. See id. at 430-31. Of the six other votes in the majority, only four supported the
rationale articulated by White in this part of the Court opinion (III-B). See supra note 75.
Moreover, in dicta, White pointed out that WMYK-FM was actually licensed to serve
Elizabeth City, North Carolina, and had only directed its signal north to reach the larger
market of Hampton Roads, Virginia. Seemingly, White was unconvinced that the station
had a truly legitimate argument based on reaching Virginia residents. White noted that the
WMYK-FM signal still reached nine North Carolina counties and allowing it to broadcast
lottery ads "would be in derogation of the substantial federal interest in supporting North
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Stevens and Blackmun dissented in Edge Broadcasting, which
was not surprising since both had been among the four dissenters in
Posadas in 1989. In his Edge Broadcasting dissent, Stevens stated: "I
would hold that suppressing truthful advertising regarding a
neighboring State's lottery, an activity which is, of course, perfectly
legal, is a patently unconstitutional means of effectuating the
Government's asserted interest in protecting the policies of
nonlottery States."'7 9
Stevens pointed to the Court's 1975 decision in Bigelow v.
Virginia.' In Bigelow, the Court overturned the criminal conviction of
a Virginia newspaper editor who had published an advertisement for
legal abortion services in New York.81 Abortions were illegal in
Virginia, and a state criminal statute banned all ads for abortion
services, including legalized abortion services in other states."' In his
Edge Broadcasting dissent, Stevens said: "[The Bigelow Court] flatly
rejected the notion ... that a State could ... [suppress] truthful,
nonmisleading information regarding a legal activity in another State"
and "held that a State 'may not, under the guise of exercising internal
police powers, bar a citizen of another State from disseminating
information about an activity that is legal in that State."'8 3 He went on
to state:
In seeking to assist nonlottery States in their efforts to shield their
citizens from the perceived dangers emanating from a neighboring
State's lottery, the Federal Government has not regulated the
content of such advertisements to ensure that they are not
misleading, nor has it provided for the distribution of more speech,
such as warnings or educational information about gambling.
Rather, the United States has selected the most intrusive, and
dangerous, form of regulation possible - a ban on truthful
information regarding a lawful activity imposed for the purpose of
Carolina's laws making lotteries illegal." Id.
79. Id. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.).
80. See id. (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)).
81. See generally Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 809.
82. See id. at 811-15. While the criminal case was pending, the Virginia legislature
amended the statute to ban only ads for "'an abortion illegal in Virginia and to be
performed there."' Id. at 813, 831 n.3 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-62.1 and 18.1-62.3
(Supp. 1975)). There was no dispute that the amended statute would not ban the
advertisement in question in Bigelow, but the editor had been convicted before the statute
was amended. See id. It also should be noted here that after the editor was convicted and
before the statute was amended, the Supreme Court issued landmark rulings protecting
abortion rights. See id. at 813 n.3 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
83. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bigelow, 421
U.S. at 824-25).
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manipulatin8g, through ignorance, the consumer choices of some of
its citizens.
Similarly, Stevens rejected what he called the government's
"extremely paternalistic" approach to the regulation of broadcast
lottery advertising.85 Stevens' dissent is important because, as will be
discussed in a later section, the Court adopted portions of this
rationale in striking down a federal broadcast ban on private casino
gambling advertising in the 1999 case, Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting.
C. Significance of Posadas and Edge Broadcasting
Taken together, the Posadas and Edge Broadcasting opinions
ratified paternalistic governmental regulation of "vice" advertising.86
To this day, the Posadas opinion stands as perhaps the Court's most
lenient application of intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson
analysis. The majority deferred without question to Puerto Rico's
asserted regulatory interests and, more importantly, blindly assumed
that regulation of gambling advertising would be effective in curing
potentially harmful secondary effects of gambling related to
behavior.87 The Court assumed, without evidence, that gambling
advertising would lead to increases in casino gambling, including
compulsive gambling, which in turn would lead to adverse secondary
effects, such as increased crime and financial ruin, related to
compulsive gambling.88 In addition, the majority opinions gave
credence to the reasoning that governmental power to ban an activity
- especially a so-called "vice" activity like gambling - provides for
some level of constitutional leniency to officially regulate truthful,
non-misleading advertising about that activity.89 It is perhaps not
surprising that one commentator recently described the Posadas
decision as "perhaps the quintessential example of Central Hudson
gone awry." 9
The Edge Broadcasting Court seemingly transplanted from
Posadas the highly deferential application of the direct-advancement
84. Id. at 439.
85. See id. The dissenters noted that at the time of the Edge Broadcasting ruling, the
majority of states - 34 plus the District of Columbia - had state-sponsored lotteries. See id.
at 440-41 (citation omitted).
86. See also Schiller, supra note 63, at 158-59.




90. Troy, supra note 9, at 132.
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inquiry under the third Central Hudson factor. In Edge Broadcasting,
the Court concluded that the federal broadcast ban on lottery
advertising in non-lottery states was necessary to protect the
gambling policies of those non-lottery states.91 However, the Court
implicitly assumed, without explanation, that such a ban served the
policies of non-lottery states in an efficacious manner. In addition, the
Edge Broadcasting Court applied the same anemic version of the
fourth Central Hudson factor as did the Posadas Court. Both simply
concluded that the respective restrictions were "narrowly tailored"
because there were exemptions that rendered them less than
complete bans.92
Posadas and Edge Broadcasting are aberrations when compared
to other commercial speech cases decided by the Supreme Court after
Central Hudson. Indeed, Posadas and Edge Broadcasting were the
only two "vice" advertising cases decided between 1986 and 1993.
They were also the only cases in which the Court directly upheld
official regulations of protected commercial speech.93 Subsequently, in
the 1994-95 and 1995-96 terms, the Supreme Court decided two more
"vice" advertising cases that radically altered commercial speech
jurisprudence and undermined the validity of Posadas and Edge
Broadcasting.
91. See Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 418.
92. For instance, the restrictions in Posadas allowed for casino gambling advertising
aimed primarily at tourists, and the restrictions in Edge Broadcasting allowed broadcast
advertising for state-sponsored lotteries by licensees in lottery states.
93. See Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. and Prof. Reg., 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (finding it
unconstitutional for state accounting board to punish attorney for including in her law
practice advertising truthful and non-misleading information about her designation as a
certified public accountant); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (striking down state
ban on in-person commercial solicitations by certified public accountants); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (finding unconstitutional an
official ban on newsrack distribution of primarily commercial publications like weekly
"shoppers" under a city ordinance that prohibited distribution of "commercial handbills"
on public property); Peel v. Attorney Reg. & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91
(1990) (holding that attorney had First Amendment commercial speech right to truthfully
advertise his certification as a trial specialist recognized by a national trial advocacy
organization despite a state bar rule that did not permit that type of advertising claim);
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (striking down state ban on targeted
solicitation letters sent by lawyers to potential clients); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (striking down a state bar rule
that imposed a blanket ban on the use of graphics and illustrations in lawyer advertising);
Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (striking down federal statute
that prohibited unsolicited direct mail advertisements for contraceptives).
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Recent Alcohol Advertising Cases
In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.94 and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island,95 the Supreme Court struck down government
restrictions banning truthful, non-misleading commercial speech
concerning alcoholic beverages. In each case, the government
asserted a goal of regulating commercial speech as a means of
decreasing alcohol demand, consumption, and ultimately, social costs
associated with alcoholism. These cases represented an important
shift toward more stringent protection of commercial speech.' It is
particularly significant that this heightened protection emerged from
"vice" advertising cases.
A. The Rubin Case (1995)
In Rubin, decided in 1995, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled
unconstitutional a long-standing federal ban on disclosure of alcohol
content percentages on beer labels.' Coors Brewing Company had
challenged the ban on First Amendment grounds in federal district
court in Denver. The district court found the ban unconstitutional.98
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, affirmed the
district court.9 The government appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
which affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.
94. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
95. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
96. See Recent Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1112, 1115 (1999) (internal citation
omitted) (stating that "44 Liquormart embraced a heightened protection of commercial
speech and rejected several lines of reasoning first articulated in Posadas," calling this an
important "doctrinal shift" in the commercial speech arena).
97. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. at 491. The case dealt with regulations
enacted pursuant to the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. See id. at 478-79 (citing 27
U.S.C. § 201 et seq.). In relevant part, specific federal regulations prohibited printing the
numerical alcohol content percentage on beer labels. Id. at 481 (citing 27 C.F.R. § 7.26(a)
(1994)). Regulations also prohibited descriptive words suggestive of high alcohol content,
such as "full strength," "high test," and "high proof." Id. (citing 27 C.F.R. § 7.29(f) (1994)).
98. See id.
99. Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F. 3d. 355, 358-359 (1993). This was the second
appeal of the case to the Tenth Circuit. On the first appeal from the district court, the
Tenth Circuit found the record incomplete regarding the third and fourth Central Hudson
factors and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. See generally Adolph
Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543 (1991). On remand, the district court again found the
labeling ban unconstitutional but upheld a similar ban on alcohol content information in
beer advertising. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. at 479. Coors Brewing Co. did
not appeal the district court's ruling on the advertising ban. See id. The U.S. Supreme
Court noted that an exemption to the advertising ban applied in all but 18 states, meaning
that alcohol percent information could legally be included in beer advertising in a majority
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In an opinion penned by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Central Hudson analysis as the appropriate
constitutional litmus test for commercial speech regulations. I°
However, in footnote two, the Rubin Court flatly rejected the
government's argument that the Central Hudson analysis should be
relaxed in favor of regulating advertising that promotes "socially
harmful" but legal activities, such as alcohol consumption and
gambling by adults.' Thomas said the Edge Broadcasting Court had
specifically declined to decide this issue in the context of gambling
advertising."° In addition, in a partial retreat from Posadas, Thomas
said: "To be sure, Posadas did state that the Puerto Rican
Government could ban promotional advertising of casino gambling
because it could have prohibited casino gambling altogether.
However, the Court reached this argument only after it already had
found that the state regulation survived the Central Hudson test."'' 3
Finally, Justice Thomas pointed out that neither Posadas nor Edge
Broadcasting required stratification of the Central Hudson analysis to
create a safe harbor for governmental regulation of "vice"
advertising.""
Under the first Central Hudson factor, the Rubin Court treated
the alcohol percent information as constitutionally protected
commercial speech." There was no dispute that the ban prohibited
Coors from providing consumers with truthful and non-misleading
information about a legal product. Under the second factor, the
Rubin Court said the government had a sufficiently substantial
regulatory interest at stake: "[P]rotecting the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens by preventing brewers from competing on the
basis of alcohol strength, which could lead to greater alcoholism and
its attendant social costs.""'°
Thomas noted that the Court had recently tightened the
of states. Id. at 488 (citations omitted).
100. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. at 482.
101. See id. at 482 n.2.
102. See supra note 72.
103. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. at 482 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340-44, 346 (1989)).
104. See id. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, subsequently pointed out that
with this language in Rubin, the Supreme Court "distanced" itself from the positions taken
on this point in Posadas. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 69 F.3d
1296, 1302 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated, 519 U.S. 801 (1996), amended by 149 F.3d 334 (5th Cir.
1998), rev'd 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
105. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S at 483,490.
106. Id. at 485.
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"critical" third factor in Edenfield v. Fane, a 1993 case decided the
same term as Edge Broadcasting.'7 He said that Edenfield now
required the government to demonstrate that its regulation of
protected commercial speech "advances the Government's interest in
a direct and material way. ' '"" Quoting from Edenfield, Thomas wrote:
"[This] burden 'is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture;
rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree.""'
Applying the third factor, the Rubin Court concluded that the
label ban was part of an irrational regulatory scheme and, thus, did
not directly advance the government's interest in stemming "strength
war" marketing.11° The Court pointed out that federal regulations
allowed alcohol content information in most beer advertising and on
labels for distilled spirits, even requiring affirmative disclosure for
wines with alcohol content exceeding 14 percent."' Thomas said that
the government presented no evidence that lifting the beer label ban
would cause an outbreak of "strength war" marketing."' He said the
government presented only "anecdotal evidence and educated
guesses" about the impact of the labeling ban on beer marketing
efforts, but found this insufficient under the third Central Hudson
factor."3
Under the fourth Central Hudson factor, the Rubin Court found
107. See id. at 486-87 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)). In Edenfield, the
Supreme Court struck down a state ban on direct, in-person solicitation by licensed
certified public accountants because it prevented truthful, non-deceptive commercial
speech.
108. Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. at 767).
109. Id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. at 770-71).
110. See id. at 488.
111. See id. at 487-89 (citations to additional federal regulatory provisions omitted).
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas said: "To be sure, the Government's interest in
combating strength wars remains a valid goal. But the irrationality of this unique and
puzzling regulatory framework ensures that the labeling ban will fail to achieve that end."
Id. at 489.
112. See id. at 489-90. The Court stated that the overall regulatory scheme in terms of
alcohol percentage information and distilled spirits, wine and beer "would have
counteracted any effect the [beer] labeling ban had extended, it is not surprising that the
lower courts did not find any evidence that [the labeling provisions] had suppressed
strength wars." Id. at 490. Indeed, there was empirical evidence to the contrary in the
record below. The Rubin Court noted that the lower courts in the case had made factual
findings that taste and lower calories are traits U.S. drinkers valued most in beer, and
higher alcohol content raised calories and adversely affected taste. See id. at 490 n.4.
113. See id. at 490.
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that the labeling ban was not sufficiently tailored to the government
interest because the government had more direct means to combat
"strength war" marketing by beer manufacturers."' These included
limits on the alcohol content of beer products and regulations against
beer advertisements emphasizing high alcohol content as a product
attribute."' As to the latter, Thomas wrote in dicta that a ban on
disclosing the percentage of alcohol content in advertising "would
seem to constitute a more influential weapon in any strength war than
labels."'"6
Although the holding in Rubin was unanimous, Stevens split with
the other justices on his rationale. He said in his concurring opinion
that the Central Hudson analysis should not be applied to regulations
that do not aim to protect consumers from misleading or incomplete
information."7 He stated: "In my opinion, the Government's asserted
interest, that consumers should be misled or uninformed for their
own protection, does not suffice to justify restrictions on protected
speech in any context, whether under 'exacting scrutiny' or some
other standard."'"8 This position was consistent with his dissents in
Posadas and Edge Broadcasting, as well as with the position he would
take in a case the very next term.
B. The 44 Liquormart Case (1996)
In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, decided in 1996, a
unanimous Supreme Court struck down a Rhode Island statute that
had for years banned price information in liquor advertising."9 A
114. Id. at 490-91.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 488.
117. See id. at 491 (Stevens, J., concurring with the judgement only).
118. Id. at 497-98. Stevens also stated: "As a matter of common sense, any description
of commercial speech is intended to identify the category of speech entitled to less First
Amendment protection should relate to the reasons for permitting broader regulation:
namely, commercial speech's potential to mislead." Id. at 494-95 (citations omitted).
Stevens also said it made no sense to characterize truthful information about alcohol
content as commercial speech when printed by Coors on a beer label but as non-
commercial speech when published, for instance, by a non-profit organization in a
magazine. See id. at 494.
119. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996). For a thorough
analysis of the various opinions in 44 Liquormart, see generally Sullivan, supra note 8. One
statute at issue in 44 Liquormart prohibited advertising the price of "malt beverages,
cordials, wine or distilled liquor. R.I. GEN. L. § 3-8-7 (1987). Another prohibited the
media from accepting such advertising. See R.I. GEN. GEN. L. § 3-8-8.1 (1987). There was
an exemption to the ban for point-of-sale price advertising that was not visible to the
public from outside the premises. See R.I. GEN. L. § 3-8-7 (1987); REG. 32, R. & REG. of
the Liquor Control Administrator.
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Rhode Island retailer was fined $400 for a newspaper advertisement
that depicted liquor in bottles next to the statement "WOW! 1 20 The
retailer then challenged the ban in federal district court on First
Amendment grounds. 2'
Rhode Island argued that lifting the ban would lead to price
competition among retailers, lower alcohol prices, and increased
alcohol consumption. 122 However, the district court ruled the ban
unconstitutional because Rhode Island did not present enough
evidence that the ban was effective in decreasing alcohol
consumption in the state.1 23 The U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit,
reversed on appeal, finding "'inherent merit' in [Rhode Island's]
submission that competitive price advertising would lower prices and
that lower prices would produce more sales.,
124
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, there was no dispute
under the first Central Hudson factor that the ban applied to truthful,
non-misleading information about a legal product or, under the
second factor, that Rhode Island had a substantial regulatory interest
in promoting temperance.125 At issue was application of the third and
fourth Central Hudson factors: Whether the ban advanced in a direct
and material way Rhode Island's interest in promoting temperance
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania followed the decision in 44 Liquormart and
declared a similar statute unconstitutional in that state. See Pennsylvania State Police v.
Hospitality Investments of Philadelphia, Inc., 689 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1997). The state supreme
court had previously upheld the statute in an earlier opinion, but the U.S. Supreme Court
had reversed and remanded for further consideration in light of its ruling in 44 Liquormart
in 1996. See Hospitality Investments of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 517
U.S. 1206 (1996), rev'd Pennsylvania State Police v. Hospitality Investments of
Philadelphia, Inc., 650 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1994).
120. The advertisement in question, placed in a local newspaper, did not contain actual
price information. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 492. The Rhode
Island Liquor Control Administrator concluded that this advertisement contained an
implicit reference to price. See id. at 492-93.
121. See id. at 493. The retailers originally sued the Rhode Island Liquor Control
Administrator. The Rhode Island Liquor Stores Association and the State of Rhode
Island intervened and became the principal plaintiff and defendant, respectively. See id.
122. See id. at 503 n.13; and 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. See id. at 494-95 (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F.Supp. 543, 555 (D.
R.I. 1993)). In support of its ruling, the court cited a 1985 Federal Trade Commission
study that found no link between alcoholism and alcohol advertising. Id. at 494 (citing 44
Liquormart Inc. v. Racine, 829 F.Supp at 549). The district court also cited another study
that found that alcohol consumption was lower in states that allowed price advertising. Id.
Another study cited by the court indicated that even with the price ban, Rhode Island
ranked in the upper 30% in per capita alcohol consumption and that states with price
advertising had lower alcohol consumption rates than Rhode Island. See id.
124. Id. at 494.
125. See id. at 493; and see also id. at 529 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20001 THE SHIFTING CENTRAL HUDSON ANALYSIS
and, if so, whether the ban was more restrictive than necessary.
Stevens, who wrote the principal opinion for the Court, said the ban
was an unconstitutional attempt to suppress the public flow of
accurate information about a legal product in the marketplace."6
Although unanimous in this part of the opinion, the justices then split
quite dramatically on their rationale and views of the Central Hudson
analysis.'27
Stevens - joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg -
said Rhode Island "failed to establish a 'reasonable fit' between its
abridgement of speech and its temperance goal." '128 Stevens said
Rhode Island "presented no evidence to suggest that its speech
prohibition would significantly reduce market-wide consumption"
and thus failed to prove direct advancement of the regulatory goal
under the third Central Hudson factor.'29 Under the fourth factor,
Stevens concluded that the price ban was more restrictive than
necessary, finding it "perfectly obvious" that Rhode Island could
regulate liquor prices more directly by imposing minimum price
regulations, taxes on liquor sales, or limits on liquor purchases, for
instance.3 °
Consistent with the position from his Rubin concurrence, Stevens
suggested that strict scrutiny - not intermediate scrutiny under the
Central Hudson analysis - is appropriate when government seeks to
regulate truthful, non-misleading commercial messages about a lawful
product and there is no consumer protection goal, such as curbing
unfair bargaining or overly aggressive marketing.' He stated: "The
First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations
that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government
126. See id. at 489 (stating that "Rhode Island's statutory prohibition against
advertisements that provide the public with accurate information about retail prices of
alcoholic beverages is... invalid" under the First Amendment).
127. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, said that while he was uncomfortable
with the Central Hudson analysis in this case, he was not inclined to "reinforce" the
analysis or "develop new law." See id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring). Instead, he merely
agreed with the result. See id. at 518.
128. Id. at 508-509 (quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 480 (1989)).
129. Id. at 505-506, 508. Stevens noted that the evidence in the record suggested that
the ban "may have some impact on the purchasing patterns of temperate drinkers of
modest means," but the "abusive drinker [would] probably not be deterred by a marginal
price increase and that the true alcoholic may simply reduce his purchases of other
necessities." Id. at 506.
130. See id. at 507. Stevens also suggested the use of public information campaigns
informing the public of the dangers of abuse. See id.
131. See id. at 501-504. See also Sullivan, supra note 8, at 142 (calling this position a
sharp "departure" from the "pro-paternalism premise of Central Hudson").
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perceives to be its own good.', 13 2 However, only Kennedy and
Ginsburg joined him on this point. In another cart of the principal
opinion, Stevens said that because the Rhode Island ban failed
intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson analysis, the ban
certainly would not survive more stringent strict scrutiny.133 Kennedy
and Ginsburg joined him again on this point, with the addition of
Souter this time.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor - joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Souter and Breyer - agreed with
Stevens that the "fit" between the price advertising ban and the goal
of promoting temperance was not "reasonable."'34 O'Connor agreed
with Stevens that Rhode Island could keep liquor prices from falling
through direct means, such as taxation, without suppressing protected
commercial speech.'35 Thus, she concluded, the Central Hudson
analysis was adequate to answer the constitutional questions
presented and needed not be "displaced" under these facts.'
3 6
"Nothing here," she said, "requires adoption of a new analysis for the
evaluation of commercial speech regulation. '
Thomas, in a concurring opinion, said it was "per se illegitimate"
for the government to "keep legal users of a product or service
ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace,' 38 a
position that one recent commentator called the most "radical" of the
approaches taken in the case.'39 Thomas alone favored a categorical
rule prohibiting what he described as an "impermissible" brand of
governmental regulation.40 However, he seemed appeased by the
132. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501-504 (1996).
133. See id. at 508. This comment by Stevens was made in a part of the opinion joined
by Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Sullivan, supra note 8, at 143.
136. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 532 (1996) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
137. Id. at 532 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating it was not necessary here to
"undertake the question whether the test we have employed since Central Hudson should
be displaced").
138. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Sullivan, supra note 8, at 141-42
(calling the position of Thomas in 44 Liquormart the most radical approach taken by the
Justices in the case).
139. See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 141-42. See also Richards, supra note 12, at 162
(calling the position of Thomas "revolutionary").
140. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 524-26 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Thomas stated: "I would adhere to the doctrine ... that all attempts to
dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant are impermissible." ld. at 526.
This was not a new position. Blackmun, joined by Brennan, had raised the same point in a
concurring opinion when the Central Hudson analysis was adopted in 1980. Blackmun
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combined impact of the opinions of Stevens and O'Connor, which he
said significantly tightened the fourth Central Hudson factor. He
wrote:
The opinions [of Stevens and O'Connor] would appear to commit
the courts to striking down restrictions on speech whenever a direct
regulation (i.e., a regulation involving no restriction on speech
regarding a lawful activity) would be an equally effective method of
dampening demand by legal users. But it would seem that directly
banning a product (or rationing it, taxing it, controlling its price, or
otherwise restricting its sale in specific ways) would virtually always
be at least as effective in discouraging consumption as merely
restricting advertising ... and thus virtually all restrictions with such
a purpose would fail the fourth [part] of the Central Hudson
analysis.14
In separate opinions, a majority of the justices in 44 Liquormart
gutted the holding and rationale of Posadas and seemingly eroded the
continued validity of Edge Broadcasting.142 In the principal opinion,
Stevens - joined on this point by Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg -
concluded that the Posadas majority erred with its "highly deferential
approach."'43 He said that a "legislature does not have the broad
wrote at the time, "I do not agree ... that the Court's four-part test is the proper one to be
applied when [the government] seeks to suppress information about a product in order to
manipulate a private economic decision that [government] cannot or has not regulated or
outlawed directly," Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
One legal commentator argued recently that the Supreme Court should abandon
the Central Hudson analysis in favor of full constitutional protection for commercial
speech. See Troy, supra note 9, at 142. He wrote:
[G]iving heightened scrutiny to restrictions on truthful commercial messages
about lawful products and services would have the salutary effect of constraining
politicians. [This] would avoid the danger of unlawful censorship that will exist so
long as commercial messages are formally subjected to reduced level of
constitutional protection where suppression of speech remains a potential tool
for policymakers seeking to influence consumer choice and where the outcome
of each case turns on the subjective evaluations of individual administrators,
legislators, and judges.
Id.
141. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 524-25 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
142. See id. at 508-514 (principal opinion penned by Stevens and joined in this part by
Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg) and 531-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Souter and Breyer). Scalia expressed no opinion on this issue,
merely concurring with the judgment of the Court. See id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See also, P. Cameron Devore, First Amendment Protection of "Vice" Advertising: Current
Commercial Speech Hot Buttons, 15 COMM. LAw. 3 (1997) (prominent commercial speech
attorney stating that the opinions in 44 Liquormart act as a "substantial overruling of
Posadas").
143. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 510 (1996) (noting the slim 5-
4 majority vote in Posadas). Stevens also stated: "As we explained in Virginia Pharmacy
Bd., 'it is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information,
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discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for
paternalistic purposes that the Posadas majority was willing to
tolerate."'44
Stevens and colleagues sharply rejected the "greater-includes-
the-lesser" rationale used by the Posadas majority, which had
presumed that government power to ban an activity necessarily
included the "lesser" power to ban advertising of that activity.'
Stevens said:
The text of the First Amendment makes clear that the Constitution
presumes that attempts to regulate speech are more dangerous than
attempts to regulate conduct. That presumption accords with the
essential role that the free flow of information plays in a democratic
society. As a result, the First Amendment directs that government
may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress conduct.
46
Stevens clearly repudiated the idea of a "'vice' exception" to the
Central Hudson analysis and said that the Court had "effectively
rejected" that proposition in footnote 2 of the Rubin opinion, penned
by Thomas.47
In her concurring opinion, O'Connor - joined by Rehnquist,
Souter, and Breyer - seemed to agree with Stevens that the Posadas
rationale was no longer valid. 148 She said that the "Court [since
and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for
us."' Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
144. Id. at 510. Stevens was joined in this part of the opinion by Kennedy, Thomas,
and Ginsburg,
145. See id. at 510-11 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates. v. Tourism Company
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345-36 (1986)).
146. Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
147. See id. at 513-14 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 n.2
(1995)). Stevens said:
Moreover, the scope of any "vice" exception to the protection afforded by the
First Amendment would be difficult, if not impossible, to define. Almost any
product that poses some threat to public health or public morals might
reasonably be characterized by a state legislature as relating to "vice activity."
Such characterization, however, is anomalous when applied to products such as
alcoholic beverages, lottery tickets, or playing cards, that may be lawfully
purchased on the open market. The recognition of such an exception would also
have the unfortunate consequence of either allowing state legislatures to justify
censorship by the simple expedient of placing the "vice" label on selected lawful
activities ....
Id.
148. See id. at 531-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The various criticisms of Posadas by
the justices in 44 Liquormart echoed those articulated by Justice Brennan in his Posadas
dissent in 1986. Back then, Brennan faulted the Posadas majority for merely assuming that
Puerto Rico's restrictions on gambling ads were efficacious in reducing the number of
local residents who gambled in Puerto Rico's legalized casinos. See id. at 355-56 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Marshall and Blackmun joined in the dissenting opinion of Brennan.
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Posadas] has examined more searchingly the [legislature's] professed
goal, and the speech restriction put into place to further it, before
accepting the [legislature's] claim that the speech restriction satisfies
First Amendment scrutiny."'49 In his concurring opinion, Thomas said
that in both Posadas and Edge Broadcasting, the majorities had
"simply presumed that advertising of a product or service leads to
increased consumption.' 5 While his opinion arguably stands with
those of Stevens and O'Connor as a rejection of the Posadas
rationale, Thomas explicitly stated that he was not addressing the
validity of Edge Broadcasting.151 Likewise, neither Stevens' principal
opinion nor O'Connor's concurrence addressed the Edge
Broadcasting decision.
C. Significance of Rubin and 44 Liquormart
The decisions in Rubin and 44 Liquormart taken together
significantly tightened the third and fourth Central Hudson factors.
Rubin, in particular, stands for the proposition that irrational and
inconsistent regulations of protected commercial speech will not
likely pass constitutional muster. In addition, the Rubin Court refused
to relax the Central Hudson analysis for regulations of "vice"
advertising. Instead, the Court demanded evidence under the third
(direct advancement) factor and crafted a direct-means analysis under
the fourth (narrowly tailored) factor, the latter of which became a
strong point of agreement for the justices in 44 Liquormart.
The 44 Liquormart opinion is most remarkable for the otherwise
dramatic split among the justices on the Central Hudson analysis. As
discussed, Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg suggested that strict
However, what he seemed to find more constitutionally troubling was the added
assumption that banning casino advertising would alleviate the gambling-related social
problems asserted by Puerto Rico. See id. at 356. Brennan also criticized the Posadas
majority at the time for allowing Puerto Rico to restrict protected commercial speech
instead of using more direct means to alleviate potential problems associated with casino
gambling. He said that such means included strictly enforcing existing laws against
prostitution and other crimes, enacting betting limitations, and using informational
campaigns to inform citizens about the dangers of excessive gambling. See id. at 356-57.
149. Id. at 531.
150. See id. at 521 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also id. at 528 (stating that "[i]n
Posadas, Edge, and other cases, the Court has presumed that advertising bans decrease
consumption") (Thomas, J., concurring).
151. Thomas said: "Because the issue of restrictions on advertising of products or
services to be purchased legally outside a State that has itself banned or regulated the
same purchases within the State is not squarely presented in this case, I will not address
here whether the decision in Edge can be reconciled with the position I take today." Id. at
527 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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scrutiny should apply when government seeks to regulate protected
commercial speech in order to manipulate lawful consumer choices in
the marketplace. Thomas was stronger on this point stating that such
a paternalistic regulatory goal never would pass constitutional muster.
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Souter, and Breyer said it was unnecessary to
even consider a new level of scrutiny for commercial speech, and
Justice Scalia abstained on this issue altogether.152
D. Evidentiary Issue
As discussed above, seven justices in 44 Liquormart agreed that
the Rhode Island statute was not narrowly tailored under the fourth
Central Hudson factor because more direct means of regulation were
available for the state to achieve its goal.'53 Thus, there was near
unanimous agreement that the Rhode Island ban was not sufficiently
narrow under the fourth factor. However, only Kennedy, Ginsburg,
and Souter joined Stevens in his discussion of the evidentiary issue
under the third factor. Still, even these justices did not reach the issue
of what quality and quantity of evidence is necessary to satisfy the
burden of proving that a governmental regulation directly advances
the asserted regulatory interest.
After Rubin and 44 Liquormart, the evidentiary parameters in
commercial speech cases remained unclear. In Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., a commercial speech case decided after Rubin, but before
44 Liquormart, a narrow 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court upheld a
state ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitations by lawyers to accident
victims within 30-days of their accidents.54 Under the first Central
Hudson factor, there was no question that the ban restricted
protected commercial speech. Under the second factor, the majority
found that Florida had asserted sufficiently substantial regulatory
interests in protecting the privacy of accident victims and the
reputations of lawyers.55
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor said that under the
third Central Hudson factor, Florida needed to demonstrate that the
"harms it recites are real and that [the regulation] will alleviate them
152. See supra note 127.
153. These seven justices were Stevens, joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Souter in
the principal opinion (Part V); and O'Connor, joined in her concurring opinion by
Rehnquist and Souter, and Breyer.
154. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620, 635 (1995).
155. See id. at 624-25. The dissenters disagreed on the characterization of these
interests as sufficiently substantial for purposes of the Central Hudson analysis. See id. at
637-40 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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to a material degree. ' '156  On this point, the majority accepted as
adequate proof a summary of the results of empirical studies of
lawyer advertising that the Florida Bar had commissioned."7 For
instance, the summary reported that in a survey of Florida adults,
over half of those who responded agreed with the statement that
contacting accident victims is an invasion of privacy.' The summary
also reported that in a survey of accident victims who had received
lawyer solicitations in the mail, approximately 25% of those polled
agreed with survey statements that the solicitations they received had
invaded their privacy and lowered their opinions of lawyers.'5 9
Florida also submitted anecdotal evidence, including newspaper
articles containing negative coverage of lawyer solicitation activity in
the state.' 6
For the majority, O'Connor - joined by Rehnquist, Scalia,
Thomas, and Breyer - said that the summary was sufficient evidence,
and that the Court need not analyze the actual studies or data. 6' In
the opinion, O'Connor noted that the studies cited by Florida were
conducted by a "nationally renowned consulting firm''162 and pointed
out that in prior speech restriction cases, the Court had allowed
litigants to refer to studies without offering direct empirical support."'
In a strongly worded dissent, Kennedy - joined by Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg - sharply criticized the majority for relying on
Florida's summary of empirical studies and anecdotal evidence. On
this point, he stated: "[The state's summary] includes no actual
surveys, few indications of sample size or selection procedures, no
156. Id. at 625-26 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 627-29.
158. Id. at 627.
159. Id. at 626-27.
160. Id. at 627. The articles included those with headlines such as "Scavenging
Lawyers" appearing in The Miami Herald and "Solicitors Out of Bounds" in The St.
Petersburg Times. Id. The majority said the anecdotal evidence was "noteworthy for its
breadth." Id. The summary also included excerpts from complaint letters that the Florida
Bar had received about lawyer solicitations. See id. at 627-28.
161. Id. at 628-29 (stating, "[W]e do not read our case law to require that empirical
data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background information").
162. Id. at 628. The company identified was Magid Associates. Id.
163. Id. (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding 100-foot campaign-
free zone around polling places); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1992)
(upholding state anti-nudity law on allegations that nude dancing would lead to social ills
such as crime, including prostitution); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
191 (1986) (upholding zoning ordinance prohibiting adult motion picture theaters within
1,000 feet of residential neighborhoods, schools, and churches on allegation that these
types of theaters would lead to harmful secondary effects like crime and reduction in
surrounding property values).
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explanations of methodology, and no discussion of excluded results.
There is no description of the statistical universe or scientific
framework that permits any productive use of the information in [the
summary]." '6' While the majority was satisfied with the sufficiency of
the evidence presented by Florida, Kennedy and the dissenters
concluded that the evidence was inadequate to satisfy the direct
advancement prong of the Central Hudson analysis. 6'
The evidence issue notwithstanding, Rubin and 44 Liquormart
went a long way toward strengthening commercial speech protection
under the First Amendment. However, questions still remained after
44 Liquormart as to how the Court might deal with then-pending
constitutional challenges to a federal broadcast ban on casino
gambling advertising.
IV
Gambling Advertising Revisited: Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting (1999)
In 1997, prominent First Amendment lawyer Cameron Devore
characterized the governmental regulation of "vice" advertising as a
"hot button" issue in commercial speech litigation.16 6 He noted that
lower federal courts were in conflict over the constitutionality of
federal laws that effectively banned broadcast ads for legalized
gambling in private, for-profit casinos.167 Other commentators
predicted that the casino advertising issue was on track for Supreme
Court review."
In 1999, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of gambling
advertising in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association Inc. v.
United States.' 69 In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a
164. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 640-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 641 (stating that "we are cited to no material in the record" that the
"regulation advances the interest of protecting persons who are suffering trauma and
grief").
166. See P. Cameron Devore, First Amendment Protection of "Vice" Advertising:
Current Commercial Speech Hot Buttons, COMM. LAW., Fall 1997, at 3.
167. Id. (citing Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1997);
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 69 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1995); Players
Int'l Inc. v. United States, Civil Action No. 96-4911 (D.N.J. 1997)).
168. See, e.g., Richard Shawn Oliphant, Note, Prohibiting Casinos From Advertising:
The Irrational Application of 18 U.S.C. § 1304, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1373, 1390-1404 (1996)
(discussing the early conflict between the 1993 district court ruling in Valley Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, which struck down the federal ban; and the 1995 U.S. Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit ruling in Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, which
upheld the ban for the first time).
169. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
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portion of the federal broadcast ban on gambling advertisements.'
70
As in Edge Broadcasting, the Greater New Orleans Broadcasting case
involved 18 U.S. Code section 1304 and the related FCC regulations
that generally prohibit broadcast gambling ads.' 7' The Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting opinion is significant as the Supreme Court's
most recent application of the Central Hudson analysis in a "vice"
advertising case. Lower court rulings leading up to the decision,
including a conflict between the Fifth and Ninth U.S. Circuits, are
worthy of discussion here as evidence of the discrepant manner in
which the Central Hudson analysis was applied by lower federal
courts in the wake of Rubin and 44 Liquormart.
A. District Court Opinion (1994)
In 1994, a coalition of Louisiana broadcasters challenged the ban
on constitutional grounds because it prevented them from accepting
paid television and radio ads for private casino gambling, a legal
activity in Louisiana and neighboring Mississippi.' In 1988, Congress
had enacted exemptions to the broadcast ban for casinos lawfully
operated by Native American tribes and state and local
governments.' However, the ban continued to prohibit broadcast ads
for private, for-profit casino gambling even in states that had
legalized that activity. Thus, the Louisiana broadcasters asked a
federal district judge in that state to invalidate the ban on First
Amendment grounds.
The district judge found the ban constitutional under the Central
Hudson analysis and granted the government's motion for summary
judgement. 71 Under the first Central Hudson factor there was "no
dispute" that the proposed ads involved a legal activity and would be
non-misleading.7 Under the second factor, he relied on Edge
Broadcasting and Posadas to find that the government had asserted
sufficiently substantial regulatory goals of "protecting the interest of
nonlottery states" and "reducing participation in gambling and
thereby minimizing the social costs associated therewith." '176 The judge
170. Id. at 1926.
171. See supra note 64.
172. See Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 181.
173. Id. at 178-79 (discussing the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 2701, et seq., and the Charity Games Advertising Clarification Act of 1988 codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1307 (a)(2)).
174. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 975,
977 (1994).
175. Id. at 979.
176. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [22:345
THE SHIFTING CENTRAL HUDSON ANALYSIS
relied on Edge Broadcasting and said that casino gambling is a "'vice'
activity" that may be eliminated by the government, clearly invoking
the "greater-includes-the-lesser" rationale.177 Under the third Central
Hudson factor, the judge again cited Edge Broadcasting and
concluded without explanation that the ban directly advanced the
asserted regulatory interests.178 Finally, under the fourth factor, the
judge said that the ban was narrowly tailored because in rulings
interpreting the ban, the FCC had allowed broadcast ads for private
casinos touting amenities like hotel rooms and food service as long as
the ads did not explicitly mention gambling.179
B. Initial Fifth Circuit Opinion (1995)
In 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed.80
Although the appeals court had the benefit of the Supreme Court's
1995 ruling in Rubin, the 1996 ruling in 44 Liquormart was still
forthcoming. Calling the application of the Central Hudson analysis
the "crux" of the case,"'' the Fifth Circuit said under the first factor
that the ban applied to truthful, non-misleading speech about a lawful
activity.' Proceeding to the second factor, the Fifth Circuit agreed
with the district judge that the government's two asserted regulatory
interests were sufficiently substantial. 183 The Fifth Circuit relied
squarely on Posadas to conclude that the federal government had a
substantial interest in the "health, safety, and welfare of its citizens"
177. See id. (citing United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (citing
generally Posadas, 478 U.S. 328).
178. Greater New Orleans, 866 F. Supp. at 979-80 (stating "the subject restrictions on
the advertisement of casino gambling are materially indistinguishable from those which so
directly served the government interest in Edge Broadcasting"). Under the third Central
Hudson factor, the district judge also relied on the notion that broadcast media are more
easily regulated than other media forms because of the scarcity rationale approved and
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. See id. at 980 (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v.
F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994); and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367
(1969)).
179. See id. at 980-81. The district court noted that under FCC regulations, the word
"casino" could appear in such broadcast ads if part of the name of the establishment. See
id. at 980 (citation to FCC regulations not in original).
180. See Greater New Orleans, 69 F.3d at 1298. For law review case comment
treatment of this opinion, see generally, Dana M. Shelton, Recent Development, Greater
New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States: The Fifth Circuit Uphold the
Federal Ban on Casino Gambling Advertising Against a First Amendment Challenge, 70
TUL. L. REV. 1725 (1996).
181. Greater New Orleans, 69 F.3d at 1299. Before reaching the Central Hudson
analysis, the appellate court summarily rejected a claim by the broadcasters that section
1304 was not intended to apply to casino gambling. See id. at 1298-99.
182. See id. at 1299.
183. See id.
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including the "goal of discouraging gambling."' ' In addition, the court
relied on Edge Broadcasting to conclude that the broadcast ban
protected the policies of non-casino states.85
Addressing the third Central Hudson factor, the Fifth Circuit
bluntly stated:
[The broadcasters] cannot seriously dispute that a prohibition of
advertising casino gambling directly advances the governmental
interest in discouraging such gambling and fulfills the third Central
Hudson prong. It is axiomatic that the purpose and effect of
advertising is to increase consumer demand. As noted in both
Posadas and Edge [Broadcasting], the vigor with which the statute
has been challenged confirms the efficacy of the prohibition.'86
Amazingly, despite Rubin, the Fifth Circuit relied on Posadas to
also reject the broadcaster's claim that numerous statutory
exemptions to section 1304 rendered it ineffective.' 7 The court also
relied on Edge Broadcasting to similarly reject the broadcasters'
argument that the federal ban was underinclusive because it singled
out broadcast media.8 1 With these arguments dispatched, the Fifth
184. Id. at 1300-01 (citing generally Posadas, 478 U.S. 328). The Fifth Circuit rejected
an argument by the broadcasters that the federal government could not legitimately seek
to discourage casino gambling in a state that had legalized such activity as a matter of state
policy. See Greater New Orleans, 69 F.3d at 1300 (citing in its discussion Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 485, 486 ,115 S.Ct. 1585, 1591 (1995); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72-73 (1983); and Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582, 584-86 (D. D.C. 1971), affd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972)).
185. See id. at 1301. This comment by the court actually was made in the discussion of
the third Central Hudson factor. See id.
The Fifth Circuit also rejected claims by the broadcasters that the federal government
could not assert a regulatory interest in the case other than protecting state policies on
gambling. See id. at 1299-1300 (rejecting an argument by the broadcasters that the
Supreme Court's decision in Edge Broadcasting supported their argument here). The Fifth
Circuit also rejected the broadcasters' claim that the federal government could not use its
power to regulate interstate commerce over a state activity like casino gambling. See id. at
1300. The Fifth Circuit called this argument audacious and said "[t]he validity as well as
substantiality of the federal interest in regulating gambling's interstate manifestations,
are ... as old as the legislation prohibiting use of the federal mails for advertising state-
chartered lotteries." Id. (citing Act of July 12, 1876, ch. § 2, 19 Stat. 90. upheld in Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877)).
186. Id. at 1301 (citing internally Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342; Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980)) (emphasis added).
187. See id. The appeals court noted that section 1304 has statutory exemptions for
fishing contests (18 U.S.C. § 1305), wagers on sporting events (18 U.S.C. § 1307(d)), state-
sponsored lotteries (18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(1), Native American gaming (25 U.S.C. § 2701),
charitable lotteries (18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2)(A)), governmental lotteries (18 U.S.C. §
1307(a)(2)(A)), and occasional and ancillary lotteries (18 U.S.C. § 1307(a)(2)(B)). See id.
at 1301 n.5.
188. See id. at 1301-02. The court said that a majority of the Supreme Court had
rejected that type of argument in Edge Broadcasting. See id. (citing Edge Broad., 509 U.S.
at 433-434). In addition, the Fifth Circuit said in a footnote "Congress is permitted more
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Circuit had little trouble concluding that section 1304 "easily"
surpassed the third Central Hudson factor."9
Under the fourth Central Hudson factor, the Fifth Circuit
continued to find Posadas compelling and said that section 1304 was
sufficiently tailored "because it prohibits only broadcast advertising
aimed at the promotion of casino gambling."'9 ° The court stated:
To the extent public demand for casino gambling is reduced by
section 1304, one governmental interest is fulfilled. To the extent the
broadcasters cannot beam casino gambling advertisements into
neighboring states that do not license private casinos, the federal
government's goal of assisting states' anti-gambling policies is
fulfilled.' 9'
The Fifth Circuit said it was "too bad" the Supreme Court in
Rubin had backed off the proposition that government could more
readily regulate "vice" advertising than other forms.'9 The court
stated:
Drawing a distinction for traditional vice activity, such as gambling
or prostitution, would provide a clear constitutional guideline,
would free legislatures to make the delicate judgements required
when legislating about these activities, and would avoid repetitious
litigation over Central Hudson in a limited category of cases.
Clarity is a virtue seldom attained and too seldom even prized in
constitutional law.
193
C. Fifth Circuit on Remand (1998)
In 1996, the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's 1995
opinion in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting and remanded for
further consideration in light of its 1996 ruling in 44 Liquormart.'9 ' In
1998, the Fifth Circuit amended its earlier opinion but, again, found
section 1304 constitutional as applied to broadcast ads for legal,
private casino gambling.' 95 In its 1998 opinion, the Fifth Circuit
intrusive regulation of the broadcast media than other forms of media." Id. at 1302 n.7
(citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994); Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367,388-89 (1969)).
189. See id. at 1302.
190. Id.
191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 519 U.S. 801 (1996).
195. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 149 F.3d 334, 335, 341 (5th
Cir. 1998). For discussion of this opinion, see generally Recent Cases, supra note 96
(concluding that the Fifth Circuit misapplied the Central Hudson analysis as reformulated
by the Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)).
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focused primarily on the application of the third and fourth Central
Hudson factors.96
Revisiting the third factor, the Fifth Circuit said the 44
Liquormart decision did not "disturb the series of decisions that has
found a commonsense connection between promotional advertising
and the stimulation of consumer demand for the products
advertised."'197 The Fifth Circuit said there is a direct connection
between the broadcast ban on casino gambling ads and the
government's asserted goal of squelching consumer demand for
casino gambling. 198 The court distinguished the price-advertising ban
struck down in 44 Liquormart as a speech restriction aimed at
reducing liquor demand by "indirectly ... affecting liquor prices." '99
Under the fourth Central Hudson factor, the Fifth Circuit again
concluded the broadcast ban on casino gambling ads was not overly
broad. The court said the ban operated more like a "time, place and
manner restriction" because, for instance, it allowed private casino
gambling ads in other media like newspapers, magazines, and
billboards." The Fifth Circuit said the regulation "targets the
powerful sensory appeal of gambling conveyed by television and
radio, which are also the most intrusive advertising media, and the
most readily available to children." '' The court found in particular
the federal broadcast ban was needed to protect the citizens of non-
196. See id.
197. See id. at 337 (citing as an example Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,569 (1980)) (emphasis added).
198. See id. The Fifth Circuit noted that Stevens said in 44 Liquormart that the third
Central Hudson factor required an evidentiary showing, but found that rationale less than
compelling stating that part of Stevens' opinion did not draw a majority of the justices. See
id. In addition, the Fifth Circuit said 44 Liquormart did not require the federal
government in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting to establish a "direct, quantitative
evidentiary link" connecting "casino gambling and compulsive gambling with broadcast
advertising for casinos" and the government clearly had not done so. Id. at 339. Strangely,
this comment was made in connection with the court's discussion of the fourth Central
Hudson prong requiring narrow tailoring and not the third prong requiring direct
advancement. See id. at 338-39.
199. Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
200. See id. at 340 (stating "there is no blanket ban on advertising").
201. Id. The Fifth Circuit also pointed out that the broadcast advertising ban did not
prohibit private casinos from advertising non-gambling amenities like food and
accommodations. See id.
The Fifth Circuit also said the broadcasters had not pointed out any "non-speech-related
alternatives" to replace the federal broadcast advertising ban but said the "efficacy of non-
advertising-related means of discouraging casino gambling is purely hypothetical, as such
measures would have to compete with the message of social approbation that would
simultaneously be conveyed by unbridled television advertising." Id.
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The Fifth Circuit said it was not necessary for the government to
prove a "direct, quantitative link" between broadcast advertising,
casino gambling, and social ills like organized crime, violence,
embezzlement, fraud, and personal bankruptcies. Indeed, the
appeals court admitted the government had failed to prove such a
link.204 The Fifth Circuit seemed to suggest that such proof was
unnecessary and stated: "The remaining advertising limits reflect
congressional recognition that gambling has historically been
considered a vice; that it may be an addictive activity; that the
consequences of compulsive gambling addiction affect children, the
family, and society; and that organized crime is often involved in
legalized gambling.
20 5
D. Conflict with Ninth Circuit in Valley Broadcasting Co.
In its 1998 opinion in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged a conflict with the Ninth Circuit ruling in
Valley Broadcasting Co. v. United States.206 In Valley Broadcasting, the
Ninth Circuit struck down section 1304 under the third factor of the
Central Hudson analysis after Nevada broadcasters challenged the
statute on First Amendment grounds.0 7 Like the Fifth Circuit in
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, the Ninth Circuit in Valley
Broadcasting said the government had asserted sufficiently
substantial interests in discouraging public participation in gambling
and protecting the policies of non-casino states.
202. See id. The court said it was "disturbing" to think that "whatever gambling is legal
anywhere may be advertised everywhere." Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
203. Id. at 338-39, 338 n.9.
204. See id. at 339.
205. Id. at 339.
206. See id. at 335 n.2 (citing Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328 (9th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1115 (1998)). For law review case comment treatment of
the Ninth Circuit opinion in Valley Broadcasting, see David Jones, Case Note, Gambling
With First Amendment Rights: Playing the Cards Dealt by Valley Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 397 (1998).
The Fifth Circuit opinion also was in conflict with a decision of a New Jersey
district court decision that struck down the federal broadcast ban on advertisements for
private, casino gambling in New Jersey where such gambling is legal. See Players Int'l, Inc.
v. United States, 988 F.Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1997).
207. See Valley Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1335-36 (U.S. 9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied 522 U.S. 1115 (1998). Because the Ninth Circuit found that section 1304
failed to pass muster under the third Central Hudson factor, the court did not reach the
fourth Central Hudson prong. See id. at 1336.
208. See id. at 1331, 1334.
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However, the Valley Broadcasting court found that section 1304
failed to directly advance the government interests because of
exemptions like those for broadcast advertising of state-run lotteries,
not-for-profit gaming, and casino gambling operated by Native
Americans."9 The Ninth Circuit said that allowing broadcast
advertising for some forms of gambling and not others undermined
both of the government's asserted interests.21 Although the Ninth
Circuit also assumed a "common sense" connection between
advertising and increased demand for casino gambling,1 the court
was nonetheless "troubled" that section 1304 allowed some forms of
broadcast gambling advertisements while prohibiting others.
E. Supreme Court Opinion (1999)
In 1999, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in Greater
New Orleans Broadcasting. The Court unanimously ruled
unconstitutional the federal ban on broadcast advertisements for
private casino gambling as applied to licensees in states like Louisiana
with legalized private casino gambling.212 Justice Stevens, who penned
the opinion of the Court, said the audience should be left to judge the
value of these advertisements without interference by the
government.213
The Court used the Central Hudson analysis to strike down the
ban as applied to broadcast licensees in states with legalized private
casino gambling.' 4 Under the first factor, the Court found that section
1304 bans protected commercial speech, meaning in this case truthful,
209. See id. at 1334-36.
210. See id. at 1335-36.
211. See id. at 1334 (stating that "common sense suggests that advertising increases
participation; indeed were this not so, it is unlikely that casinos would seek to advertise on
the Broadcaster's stations"). The court also said the "Supreme Court has expressly
recognized the connection between advertising and demand." Id. (citing Posadas, 478 U.S.
at 341-42; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
212. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 175
(1999). When the Court issued its opinion in 1999, ten states had legalized private casino
gambling: Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New
Jersey, and South Dakota. See Joan Biskupic, More Gambling Ads Likely After Court
Ruling, WASH. POST, June 15, 1999, at A3.
213. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 195 (citing Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
214. See id. at 183-87. Thomas agreed with the Court that section 1304 is
unconstitutional, but said it was not necessary to apply the Central Hudson analysis
because it was "illegitimate per se" for the government to regulate commercial speech in
this manner. See id. at 197 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)).
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non-deceptive advertising for legalized casino gambling."5 Invoking
the critical rationale and underpinnings of the Court's landmark
Virginia Board case, Stevens stated:
[T]he proposed commercial messages would convey information -
whether taken favorably or unfavorably by the audience - about an
activity that is the subject of intense public debate in many
communities. In addition, [the broadcast advertisements]
presumably would disseminate accurate information as to the
operation of market competitors, such as pay-out ratios, which can
benefit listeners by informing their consumption choices and
fostering price competition. Thus, even if the broadcasters' interest
in conveying these messages is entirely pecuniary, the interests of,
and benefit to, the audience may be broader.
Moving to the second factor, the Court concluded that the
federal government had a sufficiently substantial regulatory interest
in curbing social costs related to casino gambling by reducing demand
and protecting similar state policies.2 The government had argued
that casino gambling contributes to social problems like increased
crime, including organized crime. In addition, the government
claimed that socially harmful compulsive gambling was on the rise as
a result of more legalized gambling in America. 8 The government
claimed that compulsive gamblers are especially susceptible to
televised gambling advertising. 9
Under the third Central Hudson factor, the Court concluded that
section 1304 was too "pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies" to
advance the asserted regulatory interests in a direct and material
way.220 For instance, Stevens noted, the broadcast ban did not apply to
casino gambling operated by Native Americans or non-profit
organizations.2  In addition, the Court noted, the Federal
Communications Commission - responsible for interpreting and
enforcing the ban - had approved broadcast advertisements for
private casinos that, while not explicitly mentioning casino gambling,
215. See id. at 184.
216. Id. at 184-85 (principally relying upon Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764-765 (1976)) (emphasis added).
217. See id. at 185-87.
218. See id. at 185.
219. See id. at 189.
220. See id. at 190.
221. See id. Stevens said "the Government presents no convincing reason for pegging
its speech ban to the identity of the owners or operators of the advertised casinos." Id. at
191. In addition, Stevens said that casinos operated by Native Americans offered the same
type of gambling as private casinos and were not so isolated as to distinguish them from
private casinos as suggested by the government. See id.
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touted such attributes as "Vegas-style excitement., 22
Still under the third factor, Stevens said the government also
failed to establish a connection between casino gambling - especially
compulsive gambling - and advertising. 22 He wrote: "While it is no
doubt fair to assume that more advertising would have some impact
on overall demand for gambling, it is also reasonable to assume that
much of that advertising would merely channel gamblers to one casino
rather than another.2 24 Furthermore, the Court refused to take for
granted the "causal chain" asserted by the government - that
broadcast advertising for casino gambling spurs demand, then
increased gambling, and, finally, pernicious social costs.225 However,
the Court said it was unnecessary to decide whether the government's
lack of evidence on this point was fatal under the third Central
Hudson factor because the regulatory scheme was already fatally
221flawed with an irrational array of exemptions and inconsistencies.
Under the fourth Central Hudson factor, the Court concluded
that the government's regulatory scheme was not narrowly tailored
because practical and non-speech alternatives could be used to more
directly regulate private casino gambling. 227 For example, as Stevens
suggested, the government could enact monetary limits on wagering
and credit extended to patrons, limit automated cash machines on
casino premises, or impose stricter licensing requirements. 2" Failure
to even try these or other regulatory means instead of a speech ban
undermined the government's asserted interest, Stevens said, as had
been the case in Rubin.9
Also under the fourth Central Hudson factor, the Court clearly
rejected the "greater-includes-the-lesser" regulatory rationale.
Stevens stated: "[T]he power to prohibit or to regulate particular
conduct does not necessarily include the power to prohibit or regulate
speech about that conduct."23 ° Stevens cited Rubin and 44 Liquormart
and said that in those cases, the Court had "rejected the argument
that the power to restrict speech about certain socially harmful
222. See id. at 190.
223. See id. at 189.
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. See id.
226. See id. at 190.
227. See id. at 192.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Id. at 193 (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484, 509-11 (opinion of Stevens, J.)
(1996), 531-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 483 n.2 (1995)).
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activities was as broad as the power to prohibit such conduct., 23 An
attorney for the broadcasters said after the decision: "The court is
saying that it is not legitimate to let some ... activity like gambling
flourish.., then treat people like they are too stupid to be told
anything about it.
232
In a concurring opinion in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting,
Thomas agreed with the Court's holding but not its rationale. He
restated his position from 44 Liquormart that government may not
constitutionally try and manipulate consumer choices in the
marketplace by squelching non-deceptive commercial speech about
legal products and services.233 This type of regulatory goal is
illegitimate per se, he reiterated.3  Thus, he concluded, the majority
should not have used intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson
analysis as its constitutional test.235
It should be noted that the Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
majority did not pledge unblinking allegiance to the Central Hudson
analysis by any means. In the principal opinion Stevens noted that
judges and legal scholars had criticized the test as convoluted and less
than stringent.236 He also noted the split among the justices on the
application of the analysis in 44 Liquormart the previous term.
However, Stevens characterized the Central Hudson analysis as an
"established constitutional jurisprudence" and thus an "adequate"
basis for deciding the case at hand.237
F. Significance of Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
The Supreme Court's opinion in Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting is significant in many regards. The opinion finally and
231. Id. at 1929 (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484, 509-11 (opinion of Stevens, J.)
(1996), 531-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 483 n.2 (1995)).
232. Joan Biskupic, All 9 Justices Reject Curbs on Casino Ads; More Gambling
Commercials Expected, WASH. POST, June 15, 1999, at A3 (ellipsis in original).
233. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999)
(citing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and in the judgment)).
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 184 (citing as examples Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 526-28 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgement), and a 1990 article, Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of
Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REv. 627 (1990)).
237. See id. (stating that "we do not ordinarily reach out to make novel or
unnecessarily broad pronouncements on constitutional issues when a case can be fully
resolved on a narrower ground").
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clearly extinguishes any validity the "greater-includes-the-lesser"
rationale might have retained after Rubin and 44 Liquormart. In
other words, government power to ban a product or activity does not
alone reduce First Amendment protection for truthful, non-deceptive
commercial speech about that product or activity. Instead, the
government must regulate in a more direct manner that is less
intrusive upon the First Amendment rights of commercial speakers
and the public.
In similar fashion, the Court clearly refuted the argument that
truthful, non-deceptive commercial speech about lawful products and
activities merits less First Amendment protection when dealing with
"vice" products and activities. It is remarkable that the Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting Court analogized casino gambling advertising
to the prescription drug price advertising at issue in the Virginia
Board case. This strongly supports the proposition that truthful, non-
deceptive commercial speech about lawful products and services must
be analyzed under the Central Hudson analysis without value
judgements being placed on the products or services being promoted.
The current Supreme Court clearly intends for these value
judgements to be made by the public - especially the targets and
recipients of commercial messages - assisted by free-flowing
commercial information.
In addition, the Greater New Orleans Broadcasting opinion
questions whether a causal connection exists between advertising and
overall demand and consumption. As Stevens pointed out in the
principal opinion, advertising might instead lead to brand switching
among consumers. This statement is evidence of the Court's retreat
from axiomatic assumptions - present in the majority opinions in
Central Hudson, Posadas, and Edge Broadcasting - that advertising
increases overall demand and consumption. Even in Rubin and 44
Liquormart, the Court did not seem to seriously question such an
assumed causal connection. It seems unlikely, after Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting, that the Court will accept without evidence
causal connection assumptions regarding advertising, demand and
consumption, and harmful secondary effects. It is equally unlikely
that the Court will accept, without evidence, more convoluted causal
connections.
However, the Greater New Orleans Broadcasting case sheds no
light on the question of how much evidence is sufficient to prove that
a restriction of protected commercial speech directly advances an
asserted regulatory interest under the third Central Hudson factor.
The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Court openly avoided this
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question because it was not necessary to the holding. Thus, the split
among the justices in Went For It, the lawyer advertising case,
remains unresolved. Still, any concerns about loose evidentiary
standards under the third factor seem to be mitigated by the direct
means analysis employed by the Court in Rubin, 44 Liquormart, and
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting under the narrowly-tailored
requirement (fourth factor) of the Central Hudson analysis.
The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting opinion is not clear on
the continued validity of the Court's rationale in Edge Broadcasting.
The opinion does not explicitly address the validity of the federal
broadcast ban on casino gambling advertising as to licensees in the
some 40 non-casino states at the time of this article.238 Nonetheless,
based on the rationale employed by the Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Court, the U.S. Department of Justice officially
concluded that the federal broadcast ban could not be constitutionally
applied to truthful advertising for legal private casino gambling
regardless of whether a licensee is located in a casino or a non-casino
state.239 It seems logical to argue that Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting strongly suggests the Court will not accept a federal goal
of protecting state policies without scrutinizing them under the more
stringent version of the Central Hudson analysis employed by the
Court since Edge Broadcasting.
V
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the Supreme Court has greatly
enhanced commercial speech protection through its recent opinions
in Rubin, 44 Liquormart, and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting. In
addition, the Court has changed its approach toward "vice"
advertising - which went from being effectively outside commercial
238. See supra note 212 for a list of states allowing private, casino gambling at the time
of this article.
239. See Public Notice, Casino Advertising Enforcement Pending Disposition of
Players International Case, DA 99-2034 (Sept. 30, 1999). In addition, the U.S. Department
of Justice decided after Greater New Orleans Broadcasting not to continue defending the
constitutionality of the federal broadcast ban on advertising for private casino gambling in
a case pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. See id. The Federal
Communications Commission officially announced it would suspend enforcement of the
ban against any licensees pending further court rulings or action by Congress. See id.
When the Greater New Orleans Broadcasting case was decided, there was a pending
appeal before the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in Players International,
Inc. v. United States in which the federal district court in New Jersey struck down section
1304 as unconstitutional. See supra note 206. That case is still pending.
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speech protection in Posadas and Edge Broadcasting to being equally
protected alongside other forms of commercial speech. Indeed, based
on the Supreme Court's recent commercial speech jurisprudence, a
strong argument exists that the "vice" distinction retains little, if any,
legal significance under the current configuration of the commercial
speech doctrine.
In addition, the Supreme Court in Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting has, for the first time, seriously questioned the
assumption that advertising is causally connected to increased
consumer demand and consumption. This is remarkable since the
Court had been assuming this causal connection for almost twenty
years - since deciding the Central Hudson case. As demonstrated by
the preceding cases, government has consistently used the causal
connection assumption as a justification when trying to regulate
harmful products and activities through advertising restrictions.
Clearly, government now has an elevated burden under the third
Central Hudson factor (direct advancement) to demonstrate with
evidence that a legislative goal involving a product or activity can
somehow be achieved by restricting protected speech about that
product or activity. It is unfortunate that the Court has refused to
adequately address the issue of quality and quantity of evidence
needed under the third Central Hudson factor to prove direct
advancement. The third factor remains the murkiest of the four and,
consequently, is susceptible to varying interpretations and loose
evidentiary standards.
Despite its unwillingness to directly address the evidence issue,
the Court has unequivocally rejected the notion that governmental
power to regulate and even ban a product or activity includes the
"lesser" power to regulate truthful, non-deceptive speech about that
product or activity. Simply speaking, the latter invokes grave
constitutional concerns, and the former does not. This approach is
entirely consistent with the Court's current more stringent application
of the fourth Central Hudson factor, which requires government to
seek direct means of reaching its asserted regulatory goal instead of
restricting protected speech. The opinions in Rubin, 44 Liquormart,
and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting stand as clear and strong
precedents on this point.
Finally, four of the current justices - Stevens, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Thomas - have expressed their support for abandoning
intermediate scrutiny under the Central Hudson analysis when
government restricts truthful, non-deceptive advertising in order to
manipulate lawful consumer choices in the marketplace. It remains to
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be seen whether an additional justice will join these four and create a
majority on this position in a future commercial speech case. If so,
that would mark yet the most dramatic development in the
commercial speech doctrine since the Court assimilated pure
commercial speech into the First Amendment in Virginia Board in
1976.
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